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of immediate, effective, contempt action which the injunction previously
enjoyed, the real problem may well lie within the older rule. It may be
virtually impossible to enjoin the diverse groups of students, faculty, staff,
and street people who may have a part in the campus disorder. Without
being able to show a strong bond between those charged with contempt
and those actually mentioned in the injunction itself, it is doubtful
whether a court could allow them to be brought as defendants into a
criminal court action. The university then, may have to handle the cam-
pus riot as they would any other criminal act. They may bring the viola-
tors to trial in criminal courts, or in the alternative, develop an effective
campus judiciary whose final punishment may be suspension or expulsion
from the university community.
ARTHUR F. DOBSON, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-EXCLUSIONARY RULE HELD NOT APPLICABLE TO
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF KNOWN WITNESS MADE POSSIBLE BY LEAD
RESULTING FROM ILLEGAL SEARCH IN INVESTIGATION OF UNRELATED CRIME.
In October, 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department in the course of
investigating a series of burglaries obtained a search warrant to enter peti-
tioners' apartment. Among other articles found in the house, a gun was
seized.' The warrant was thereafter held to be legally insufficient 2 and all
items confiscated as a result of the search were deemed inadmissible as
evidence against petitioners.8 The gun's serial number, however, was traced,
and it led the police to a robbery victims' report at the Lennox Sheriff's
station. The robbery was on the "inactive" 4 file and had not been actively
investigated for over two years. The police contacted the robbery victims
and showed them photographs of the petitioners whom they identified.
See Katzenbach, Protest, Politics and the First Amendment, 44 TUL L. Rav. 439,
440, 449, (1970). Speaking on "governmental" reaction to violent demonstrations for
social change, the former United States Attorney General stated:
What is being tested is the capacity of our political institutions to maintain
that essential public confidence which lies at the heart of our democracy, while
at the same time coping with the stresses and strains of a very rapidly changing
society.
And in conclusion, Mr. Katzenbach suggests:
[I]f the objective of government is-as it should be-to maintain confi-
dence in its processes, it may often have to go well beyond what is constitu-
tionally required to prove its point.
1. Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 166, 168, 474 P.2d 683, 684, 89 Cal. Rptr.
731, 732 (1970) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. See Lockridge v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 612, 80 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct.
App., 2d Dist. 1969).
3. Instant case at 168, 474 P.2d at 684, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
4. A case is "inactive" when all pertinent points have been investigated. Instant
case at 168 n.1, 474 P.2d at 685 n.1, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 733 n.1.
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Subsequently, petitioners were arrested and charged with robbery. Peti-
tioners moved, pursuant to section 1538.5 of the California Penal Code, 5
to suppress the testimony of the victims, maintaining that it would be
inadmissible as "fruit" of an illegal search. The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County denied the motion and petitioners then sought a writ of
mandate to compel the Superior Court to suppress the victims' testimony.
The Supreme Court of California denied the writ by a vote of 4-3. Held,
where an illegal search warrant is issued and a witness to an unrelated
crime becomes available as a result of a lead supplied by the illegal search,
his testimony is admissible if he is already known to the police, even though-
the unrelated crime was on the "inactive" file and there is no evidence
that without the lead supplied by the illegal search, the petitioners would
have been connected with the crime. Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d. 166, 474 P.2d 683, 89 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970).
The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure6 has found expression in the exclusion from trial of all evidence
which was illegally seized.7 This rule of exclusion has been accepted in
all federal courts since 1914, and has also been deemed to restrict the
evidentiary value of "a man's own testimony or of his private papers..."
when such products were discovered as a result of an illegal search and
seizure.8
The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states in Wolf v.
Colorado,9 but it was not until Mapp v. Ohiolo that the Supreme Court
enforced the exclusionary rule upon the states, with the Court holding
that the "exclusionary rule is an essential part of both -the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."" The reasons12 given in Wolf for refusing to
5. CAL. PNAL CODE § 1538.5 (a) (Wst Cum. Supp. 1971) provides that:
A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible
thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on (the grounds that]: ...
(2) the search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because i) the war-
rant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not that
described in the warrant ....
6. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures.
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 US. 616, 630 (1886).
9. 338 US. 25 (1949).
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. Id. at 657.
12. The Wolf Court refused to enforce the federal exclusionary rule against the
states, since "the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different
order." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The "questions" referred to in Wolf
reflected the reservation the Court had about the propriety of forcing a federal rule of
evidence upon the states. By applying this rule against the states, the Court in Wolf
would have had to "brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of
such conduct [illegal entry] by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy...."
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enforce the exclusionary rule upon the states were no longer considered
to be valid by the Mapp court, since the remedies provided by the states
to insure the fourth amendment guarantees had proved to be wholly in-
adequate.S
The development of the exclusionary rule led to the restriction of all
types of illegally-obtained items from evidence. Although Mapp was par-
ticularly concerned with the exclusion of real or tangible evidence illegally
seized, the exclusionary rule also affected testimonial evidence which was
obtained pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.' 4 Federal courts had
already held such testimony to be inadmissible, and state courts had no
trouble in excluding testimony from evidence which was a direct result of
the illegal search. Thus, in People v. Mickelson,15 it was held that where
the availability of a witness is a direct result of an illegal search, the wit-
ness is no longer competent to testify. Similarly, a witness' testimony was
suppressed where police conducted an illegal search of defendant's apart-
ment in hope of finding drugs and instead found the witness.10
The exclusionary rule also became applicable to the testimony of a
witness who was discovered indirectly through an illegal search and seizure.
As early as 1920, the Supreme Court declared in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States17 'that all "fruits" of an illegal search were not admissible
in a federal court. After Mapp v. Ohio, the exclusionary rule applied to
state courts with the "same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government."18 Thus, a witness' testimony which was a direct or
indirect product of an illegal search and seizure could never be used in
any court. For example, where an illegal search was conducted in a doc-
tor's office, and records, which led police to patients who had received an
illegal abortion, were confiscated, the court held the testimony of the pa-
tient to be a by-product of the illegal search and therefore not admissible.19
Likewise, indirect by-products of documents illegally seized have been held
Id,. at 31, 32. In addition, the Wolf Court was of the opinion that the states had
adequately provided "other means of protection" to insure the right to privacy guaran-
teed by the fourth amendment. Id. at 30.
13. 367 U.S. at 652. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), where the Court
explores the inadequacy of other remedies.
14. People v. Mikelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
Testimonial evidence is "intangible" evidence within the meaning of California Penal
Co e secton 1538.5(a), and may be suppressed. Instant case at 169, 474 P.2d at 685,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
15. 59 Cal. 2d 448, 449, 380 P.2d 658, 659, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 19 (1963).
16. People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954). For a recent application
of the directness approach, see People v. Welborn, 2 Cal. App. 3d 715, 82 Cal. Rptr. 845
(CL App., 2d Dist. 1969).
17. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
18. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
19. People v. Schaumloffel, 53 Cal. 2d 96, 346 P.2d 393 (1959). See also People v.
Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1943).
RECENT CASES
inadmissible as evidence, and "where the bounds of a reasonable search
have been exceeded . . . neither the evidence wrongfully seized nor any
of its derivatives may be used against defendant." 20 Such derivatives or
by-products have become known as the "poisonous fruit" of the illegal
search and seizure.2 '
In the instant case, the majority rejected the idea that all facts which
are products of an illegal search are "sacred and inaccessible."2' Since the
witnesses were already known to the police as the victims of an unsolved
robbery, this, the court argued, was sufficient to remove the "taint" of the
poisonous fruit. It was no more than pure "happenstance" that the police
came across the gun taken in the robbery while they were investigating an
unrelated crime.2 3 The witnesses would therefore be allowed to testify be-
cause they became known to police through "independent means" and not
as a result of an illegal search.24 To support its holding, the court found
an alternative basis for admitting the testimony. The majority pointed
out that the illegal search did not lead to the discovery of witnesses "at
its scene" who would not otherwise have been known to police, nor did
it lead to the victims as "the source of further evidence of the crimes that
the police were investigating."2 5 Therefore, the testimony of -the victims
was admissible because they would have been discovered anyway "in the
normal course of a lawfully conducted investigation." 26 The majority found
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be defeated by allow-
ing the witnesses to testify, since "that purpose was adequately served by
suppressing the gun and the evidence of the other crimes that the police
were seeking."2
7
Three judges dissented, arguing that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule would be defeated by failure to suppress the victims' testimony which
was "obtained as a direct, immediate and necessary result of the unlawful
seizure of the gun. .. "28 By not prohibiting the admissibility of all evi-
dence derived from an illegal search, the dissent feared that there would
be a profit and incentive for law officers to disregard the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. Thus, the dissent felt that the majority was encour-
aging the "general search," since the court suppressed those items specifi-
20. People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App. 2d 392, 399, 306 P.2d 1005, 1012 (Ct. App., 2d-
Dist. 1957).
21. People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 476, 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 771, 776 (Ct.
App., 1st Dist. 1970).
22. Instant case at 169, 474 P.2d at 685, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 733.





28. Id. At 173, 474 P.2d at 688, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
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cally sought but allowed into evidence the "fruits" of matters not sought.29
Consequently, argued the dissent, this would have great significance for
searches which are conducted without probable cause, since there would
always be a chance that the police could find something that would have
evidentiary value in an unrelated crime. 0 Where there is probable cause,
however, "law enforcement officials will often be deterred from unlawful
conduct [for] . . . fear of jeopardizing their right to obtain evidence which
could be lawfully seized."31
An analysis of the rationale used by the court reveals that the majority
incorrectly applied established principles of law. The California Supreme
Court "has consistently held that the testimony of a witness who was dis-
covered by the exploitation of illegal police conduct is not admissible."3 2
The majority in Lockridge admitted the testimony of the witnesses, by ap-
plying two established exceptions to the exclusionary rule; (a) that they
had become known to police by means independent of the illegal search,
or in the alternative, (b) because their testimony "would have been dis-
covered in the normal course of a lawfully conducted investigation."3 3 Yet,
these exceptions would appear not to be warranted by the factual setting
of the instant case. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the court
to rationalize its holding based on the "independent means" test. The
majority conceded that "there is no evidence that without the lead sup-
plied by the gun, the police investigation of petitioners would have led
them to the robbery report or suggested to them that petitioners might
be guilty of the . . . robbery."3 4 The "independent means" test is used
most frequently with regard to the admissibility of confessions derived
from an illegal search and seizure. In Wong Sun v. United States,35 for
example, a defendant was illegally arrested, and after being released on
his own recognizance, he voluntarily returned several days later to make
a confession. The Supreme Court said that the connection between the
arrest and the statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint" of the illegal arrest.3 6 The standard used by the Court in Wong Sun
was whether the evidence came about as a result of the "exploitation of
[the] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
29. Id. at 174, 474 P.2d at 688, 89 Cal. Rptr, at 736.
30. Id. at 174, 474 P.2d at 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 170, 474 P.2d at 685, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
33. Id. at 170, 474 P.2d at 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
34. Id.
35. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
36. Id. at 487, quoting from Naxdone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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of the primary taint."' 7 The Court made it clear, however, that the free
will of the defendant was the deciding factor and that all other evidence
discovered directly or indirectly as a result of the illegal search would not
be admissible, since they were "poisonous fruits" of the illegal police con-
duct.38
It is unclear what the standard would be for the "independent means"
test when it is applied outside the area of confessions. Since the Court in
Wong Sun did not restrict its holding to confessions, any information which
was acquired through the "exploitation" of illegal conduct would probably
not be admissible. This is not to say that knowledge which is truly gained
from an independent source could not be used as evidence, "but the knowl-
edge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it ... "39
The cases cited by the majority for support of the "independent
means" test would not warrant its application in the instant case. In State
v. O'Bremski,40 the police illegally entered defendant's apartment where
they found a fifteen year old girl of whom defendant had carnal knowl-
edge. The girl was subsequently allowed to testify against the defendant.
This is distinguishable from Lockridge, since the police knew the identity
of the girl and the defendant's relationship with her prior to the illegal
search, while in Lockridge, the police were ignorant of the connection
between the defendant and the robbery victim prior to the illegal entry.
The court also cited People v. Stoner,41 where a witness identified the de-
fendant while he was in the custody of an illegal arrest. Although this
identification was held inadmissible, a subsequent identification was al-
lowed. The connection between the defendant and the witness was known
prior to the illegal arrest and the court explained that "the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine has not been invoked when the alleged fruit is
testimony of a witness to a crime whose identity was not learned through
police misconduct." 42 In the instant case, however, the connection between
the witness and the defendant was learned through police misconduct.
The court in Lockridge did not rely solely on the "independent
means" test, and rationalized its holding on alternative grounds: namely,
that the testimony was admissible because the witness "would have been
discovered in the normal course of a lawfully conducted investigation. '43
37. Id. at 488, quoting from J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE oF GUILT 221 (1959). See also
United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People v.
Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); State v. Schneidewind, 47 Wis. 2d
110, 176 N.W.2d 303 (1970).
38. 371 U.S. 471, 486-88 (1963).
39. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
40. 70 Wash. 2d 425, 423 P.2d 530 (1968).
41. 65 Cal. 2d 595, 422 P.2d 585, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967).
42. Id. at 602, 422 P.2d at 589, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
43. Instant case at 170, 474 P.2d at 686, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
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This recognized exception to the exclusionary rule allows testimony to be
admitted if the prosecution can prove that the information so gained "has
not 'led,' directly or indirectly, to the discovery" of any testimony which
is introduced into evidence.44 The standard for the "sine qua non"45 test
is that if the testimony "would have been discovered, even if the unlawful
act had never taken place," then it is admissible.46 The prosecution must
show "that it would have obtained the otherwise tainted evidence even if
the unlawful act had not occurred."'4 In the instant case, it is improbable
that the prosecution could show that it would have discovered the con-
nection between the witnesses and the defendants, since the robbery case
was on the "inactive" file and had not been actively investigated for over
two years.4s It is simply not enough that the police had a report of the
robbery and that they could have or might have associated the robbery
with the defendants. 49 Furthermore, the state must show that it "has not
in fact benefitted from the wrongful act, which can be done only by a
showing that discovery of the proffered evidence was inevitable."5 0 A
showing of this is highly unlikely, considering that the robbery case was
"inactive" and that the police were investigating petitioners for a totally
unrelated crime.
The majority's strained application of the "independent means" and
the "sine qua non" tests to the factual setting of the case indicates that
there may have been underlying considerations not manifest in the ma-
jority opinion that guided the court to its holding. After disposing of the
majority's contention that the case can be rationalized on established
principles of law, the dissent goes to great lengths to point out that the
exclusionary rule is a necessary enforcement of constitutional guarantees
"even though some criminals should escape."51 The majority may have
been aware that if -the defendants were successfully allowed to invoke the
exclusionary rule, they probably never could be arrested for the robbery
since it would be difficult to prove that the lead supplied by the gun was
44. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950).
45. Maguire, How To Unpoison The Fruit-The Fourth Amendment And The
Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Csis. L.C. & P.S. 807, 313-14 (1964).
46. Id. at 814.
47. Id. at 315.
48. Instant case at 168, 474 P.2d at 685, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
49. Maguire, supra note 45, at 815. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
exclude all evidence that "would not have been found, if officials had not violated the
laws designed to deny them access to it." United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2d
Cir. 1950) (emphasis added). For a somewhat different opinion on the admissibility of
evidence that "would" have been discovered anyway, see United States v. Schipani, 414
F.2d 1262, 1266 (2d Cir. 1969).
50. Maguire, supra note 45, at 816.
51. Instant case at 173, 474 P.2d at 688, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 736, quoting from People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 488-89, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
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not the basis for their arrest. If the court was aware of this, as the dissent
tacitly implies, then the majority was essentially making a policy choice.
The fact remains, however, that the policy choice that created the exclu-
sionary rule "was [already] made"5 2 and any arguments against it "should
be addressed to the question [of] whether [the rule] should exist at all."5 3
A fear that the defendant will never be punished for his criminal acts will
not "justify a failure to enforce [the rule] while [it] remains the law of
the land."5 4
It is becoming evident, however, that such policy choices are often
made by courts. In Hollingsworth v. United States,55 the United States
Court of Appeals said:
The steady increase in the number of serious crimes throughout
the United States is a matter of grave concern. Of course, the
constitutional rights of the individual should be protected. But
in our zeal to safeguard those rights, we must not be unmindful
of the public interest involved and we should not erect any un-
necessary barriers that will thwart the law enforcement officers
in the performance of their duties to investigate, detect and se-
cure evidence of crime.
Similarly, in Payne v. United States,56 the court was horrified at the pos-
sibility of allowing the defendant to invoke the exclusionary rule, since
the majority feared that, "the consequence of accepting appellant's con-
tention in the present situation would be that [the witness] would be for-
ever precluded from testifying against [the defendant] in court . . .,,5
If the exclusionary rule is to be an effective safeguard of the constitu-
tional rights guaranteed by the fourth and fourteenth amendments, then
"violations of procedural rights must occasion reversal, irrespective of ac-
tual guilt."5 8 When a defendant raises a fourth amendment argument,
courts are not solely concerned with the rights of the individual defendant
but rather with the "constitutional right of all of the people to be secure
in their homes, persons and effects." 59 It must be remembered that allow.
ing guilty defendants to go free "is a regrettable by-product of the rule
and not its objective." 60
52. Instant case at 173, 474 P.2d at 687, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 735, quoting from People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
53. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 450, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955).
54. Id.
55. 321 F.2d 342, 353 (10th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
56. 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
57. Id. at 727.
58. Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. Rxv. 80, 95
(1969).
59. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 439, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
60. Maguire, supra note 45, at 308.
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The arguments proposed by the dissent, that the holding of Lockridge
would encourage a "general search" and provide an incentive for law en-
forcement officials to violate an individual's constitutional rights, clearly
reflect the long-standing rationale of the exclusionary rule. The under-
lying effect of the holding in Lockridge, however, is to restrict the exclu-
sionary rule and allow courts to engage in making policy choices even
though the binding choices of policy have already been made by the United
States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States(' and Mapp v. Ohio.62
The driving force of Mapp v. OhioP3 was a "belief of the majority in the
utter emptiness of the right assimilated by due process in Wolf without
the remedy of exclusion."' 4 When a state court is free to make a policy
choice and thereby restrict the exclusionary rule, the remedy becomes al-
most non-existent.
HOWARD J. LEVINE
CRIMINAL LAW-VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS HELD ADMISSIBLE EVEN
THOUGH OBTAINED BY MEANS OF INTERROGATION IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL.
In January, 1965, the defendant was arrested for murder and taken
to the police station where he was permitted to confer with his attorney.
When the attorney left the room, indicating to the detective on duty to
"watch" the defendant while he went some place in the building, the de-
tective asked defendant, "[D]id you ever think it would wind up like this?"'
The defendant replied affirmatively and commenced to describe the crime
in detail. The incriminating admissions were allowed into evidence at
trial. The defendant was convicted in New York County Supreme Court
of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant
moved on appeal for reversal and a new trial on the grounds that once
an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding, admissions made in his
absence constitute a denial of the right to counsel and are therefore in-
admissible. The conviction was affirmed by the appellate division.2 The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a five to two decision. Held, vol-
untary admissions made to a police officer are not inadmissible merely
because they were made in response to questioning in the absence of de-
fendant's counsel. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970).
61. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62. 36,7 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. Id.
64. Wolf, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
193, 212 (1963).
1. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794
(1970).
2. People v Robles, 32 App. Div. 2d 741, 800 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Ist Dep't 1969).
